Letters to Polonia Today
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The following is a memo received on
December 10, 2009, from David M. Dastych, Warsaw Correspondent,
regarding the reports by Reuters and Radio Free Europe-Liberty that
General Wojciech Jaruzelski wanted a soviet invasion of Poland.
Dear Editor:
As to General Wojciech Jaruzelski, he
denied asking for Soviet military help. This information (about him
allegedly asking Soviet leader for military intervention in Poland)
recently disclosed by the IPN (Institute for National Remembrance)
is not new, it was first disclosed by Boris Yeltsin in a bunch of
documents transferred to Poland in the 1990s. Jaruzelski had to play
a difficult game with the Soviets in 1980-1982. Now Soviet marshals
and generals deny they ever wanted to invade Poland in these years.
But they were ready all the time. They just wanted to avoid
repetition of the general condemnation and economic sanctions that
followed after their intrusion into Afghanistan.
In the 1980s, and before, I worked
against Soviet intelligence and after the formation of Solidarity I
witnessed many attempts to provoke chaos and even a civil war in
Poland. I also followed Soviet contacts with Communist hardliners in
Poland, who opposed General Jaruzelski and pushed toward Soviet
military intervention in my country.
History is never so simple as simple
minds imagine it. And it never is "black-white" without any shades.
The IPN is now headed by nationalistic and anticommunist historians
who produce documents against many prominent people to discredit
them. Also Lech Walesa became a victim of such vilification. As
General Jaruzelski is the last still living former communist leader
of Poland, they attack him viciously all the time.
I wrote to you (perhaps) about my
meetings with General Jaruzelski in the 1990s and after 2000. I
asked him many unpleasant questions, to which he responded with calm
and dignity. He knew I was in the CIA and that I was jailed in
communist Poland. But still he was eager to meet me and to share
information and to discuss recent history. He always sent to me
manuscripts of his books before they were published and also
documents from his trials. I have a large volume of documentation
from him.
It doesn’t mean that I trust Jaruzelski
100%. I know he had to build a "legend" about himself as a "savior
of Poland" in the 1980s and as the leader who supported the regime
change in Poland.
I also got in touch with some former
Soviet generals and other officers who told me how they were
preparing for crushing Solidarity and "restoring order" in Poland.
One of them was the commander of a crack paratroopers division
stationed at Kovno, Lithuania (then a Soviet Republic.) His task was
to fly to Warsaw and to take over the headquarters of the Polish
Communist Party (PUWP), the Polish Government and the General Staff
of the Polish Army. They sent their spies to Warsaw several times to
prepare the surprise invasion.
The old Soviet leadership under
Brezhnev (in fact the USSR was ruled by a "troika" of Suslov,
Andropov and Gromyko) was not too eager to repeat in Poland the
invasion like in Hungary (1956) or in Czechoslovakia (1968). They
planned and executed very strong pressure on Poland in the early
1980s and penetrated both Solidarity and the Polish communist
authorities with their vast spy network (KGB and GRU). Soviet spies
were also close to General Jaruzelski (I met at least two of them
later; they were officers of the Polish Army and the Military
Intelligence.) The Soviet leadership trusted Jaruzelski, but not to
the end, knowing that he was a scion of the Polish landed gentry
(with a family history reaching back to 13th century) and his family
was persecuted by Soviets during the war. His father died in
Altaysky Kray and he himself saved his life from perpetual exile by
joining the Polish Army organized under Soviet command. He fought in
WWII until the end (until the takeover of Berlin.) Then he pursued
his military and communist party career in postwar Poland, knowing
that there will be no other, free Poland under the Soviet
domination.
In case, the martial law introduced by
General Jaruzelski in December 1981 were not successful, the Soviets
had an alternate, hard-line communist leadership for Poland, and
they might support a brutal and bloody crackdown on Solidarity with
their military forces already present on the Polish national
territory (they had several hundred thousand troops here, including
tank divisions, air force and even nuclear weapons.)
When preparing for the
military-executed martial law in Poland, Jaruzelski had to
communicate with the Soviet leadership all the time. A Polish
general from the General Staff came from Moscow with a detailed plan
of maneuvers of the Warsaw Pact in the Fall of 1980. In December,
1980, Soviet, Czechoslovakian and East German forces of the Pact
were to enter Poland and encircle the main units of the Polish Army.
The General Staff "decoded" their plans and General Jaruzelski, as
the Minister of Defense, ordered a new dislocation of the Polish
Army to counter foreign forces. But the top Soviet political
leadership backed out under American pressure and cancelled the
maneuvers of the Warsaw Pact at that time.
In December, 1981, the situation was
different and probably the Soviets put their stakes on the
"internal" solution, martial law to be introduced by Jaruzelski. The
timing was not known. I got some hints from friends, officers of the
Polish Army, in November, 1981. But no one of them knew an exact
date. Not even Jaruzelski himself, because he still tried to calm
the situation by tripartite talks involving Lech Walesa, Primate
Josef Glemp and himself. But, Solidarity planned a huge rally in
Warsaw for December 14 (the anniversary of the bloody crackdown on
Polish workers in Gdansk in December, 1970,) then the date of the
rally was moved to December 17, 1981. Jaruzelski was not sure what
the Soviets could do when the rally of roughly one million people in
Warsaw could begin riots and attacks on the communist party
leadership. Nobody could control that. So the final decision to
introduce martial law (named "The Wartime Law") came about noon on
Saturday, December 12, 1981. I learned about this only in the
evening of that day (the attack on Solidarity in Gdansk began on
midnight December 12/13.)
I was supposed to meet and interview
Lech Walesa in Gdansk on Saturday, December 12 and I booked my
flight to that city. But on Friday, December 11, a friend from
Gdansk Solidarity came to meet me in Warsaw and he told me a
radical, "nationalistic" fraction of the Solidarity Trade Union
wanted to oust Walesa on Saturday and to proclaim a general strike
in Poland. I didn’t believe they could simply vote to oust Lech
Walesa, so I instructed my reporter covering an All-Poland
Solidarity Committee meeting in Gdansk, to approach Walesa and shift
our interview date from Saturday to Sunday – December 13, 1981.
In the evening I got a call from my
Gdansk reporter that telex communications were being interrupted. I
asked him to call back to my home after 10:00 p.m., while I was
preparing my car to drive to Gdansk in the early morning on Sunday,
December 13. But in the late evening on Saturday (December 12) the
phones were not working. I went to sleep after midnight, hoping that
these were only some "tests" of the "state of emergency" that was
being prepared by the army, the militia and the security units. But
getting up early on Sunday, I put my radio and TV sets on and there
was transmitted a speech of General Jaruzelski announcing martial
law. I knew, there was no possibility for me to go to Gdansk. In the
early morning I drove to downtown Warsaw to see what was happening
there. The tanks, troop carriers and other vehicles, and the
infantry and militia patrols, in the streets of Warsaw were POLISH.
It was the sign for me that the Soviets kept out.
Later on I got information from
intelligence sources (Soviet, East German) that the Warsaw Pact
troops were on alert until the Summer of 1982. Just in case Polish
martial law were not successful.
David M. Dastych